Equilibrium Behavior and Optimal Contract of Both-Sides Moral Hazard with Risk Averse 风险规避下双方道德风险均衡行为与最优契约
We design the linear incentive contract in the circumstance of asymmetric information and moral hazard. 考察了两类不对称信息&逆向信息和道德风险并存下的供应链线性契约。
Secondly, the contract including two parameters of wholesale price and fixed fee was designed when there is moral hazard. 然后在存在双边道德风险情况下,设计了包含产品批发价格和制造商支付给零售商的固定费用这两个参数的契约。
The model, in which the risk types of insured are divided into high, medium and low cases, discussed the contract formation under the condition of adverse selection and moral hazard. 将投保人风险类型分为高、中、低三种情况,讨论了存在逆向选择和道德风险约束情况下寿险契约的订立问题。
The thesis designs the incentive contract which postponed the payment of the part of incentive income after moral hazard observation. 论文设计了将资产管理公司每年激励分享收益的一部分延期在道德风险观察期满后支付的激励合同。
At the same time, the implicit contract which is the key factor during the operation of cooperative R& D can mitigate the risk of adverse selection, opportunistic behavior and moral hazard problems aroused by bounded rationality, uncertainty and incomplete information. 与此同时,隐性契约可以很好地缓解有限理性、不确定性和不完全信息所引发的逆向选择、机会行为和道德风险等问题,是合作研发运行过程中不可避免的关键因素。